Inspirational, romantic but ultimately doomed to fail, 1857, writes Chandan Mitra, was the last gasp of old India.
India is as confused about 1857 today as it was when it happened. What was 1857? India’s only armed national uprising? A mere Sepoy Mutiny? The failed First War of Indian Independence as Savarkar asserted? A disjointed, haphazard attempt by dispossessed rulers and local chieftains to reclaim lost authority?
| A jihadi conspiracy to overthrow infidel rule and re-establish the power and glory of the Mohammedan faith in India – still a candidate country for conversion to Dar-ul-Islam? Conversely, a rare, post-Shivaji Hindu foray into armed insurrection to protect the honour of the Brahmin and the cow? Or a violent peasant protest against the perceived feringhee move to destroy millennia-old cultural legacies and replace feudal benevolence with impersonal, alien codified laws? | ||
| Was it a cleverly planned, proto-modern, anti-imperialist movement that could have led to India’s emergence as a powerful Asian nation rubbing shoulders with Europe, America and the Ottoman Empire? Or a retrograde throwback into a fissiparous, casteist, exploitative ancien regime that would have pushed India again into the divisive cauldron that followed Aurangzeb’s death in 1707? | ||
| Whatever it was, in retrospect the Great Uprising was incredibly romantic in its resplendent canvas. Visualise those dried lotus petals carried from village to village across the Indo-Gangetic heartland by rustic runners, lathi in hand, dark cloth covering them head to toe, chestnut-brown eyes shining in the dim glow of lanterns. Their job was to reach remains of lotus flowers to the dominant Hindu family of the nearest village, enjoining them to cry freedom. A Muslim counterpart would similarly run, chapati in hand, a symbolic declaration of revolt that virtually made it mandatory for the recipient to join the holy war to overthrow the feringhee. | ||
| Visualise the shadowy Maulvi of Faizabad, draped in a black al-khallah, who would walk in and out of the dusty cantonment, once upon a time military headquarters of Avadh’s erstwhile capital, Bangla (those who have seen Muzaffar Ali’s Umrao Jaan will get the reference). His job as a disciple of Shah Waliullah, harbinger of the Waha’bi sect, was to inspire Muslim recruits of the Company’s marauding army to revolt in defence of Islam. | ||
| Imagine the ferocious pride of Rani Lakshmibai of Jhansi, who risked her all to protect the principality from within and without. Recall Nana Saheb, the intellectual hero, strategist and ideologue, sending emissaries to distant lands almost seeking international recognition for a government-in-the-making, a virtual forerunner of Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose’s Azad Hind Huqumat, proclaimed in Singapore 86 years later. | ||
| Visualise the Declaration of Independence by Babu Kunwar Singh, the rebel Rajput of Ballia-Maharajganj, the firmans of Muslim fief-holders of Avadh, the effervescent joy at the panic and trepidation of the once all-powerful “gora“, (eloquently captured in Shyam Benegal’s Junoon), the magnificent sense of triumph of tradition over alien modernity. The Indian mosaic, its caste and community cohesion, the fusion of Nakki Khan and Mangal Pandey who fired 1857′s first salvo, was never painted in such rainbow colours before or after the Great Uprising. | ||
| Six years earlier a young man in southern China had similarly raised the banner of revolt against extortionist foreigners and the supine Manchu Emperor, proclaiming the parallel Tai’ping Tien’kuo (Kingdom of Heavenly Peace). But he compromised by seeking legitimacy from the very foreigners by anointing himself “younger brother” of Jesus Christ in an attempt at ingratiating himself to those whom the Manchus called “foreign devils” and “barbarians”. | ||
| Howsoever inchoate and disorderly, the Great Uprising of 1857 brooked no compromise with “dharam-imaan” – religion and morality. The Tai’ping Movement petered out in three years; the I-Ching or Boxer Uprising of 1900 was an abysmal failure in nine months. Neither finds recollection in collective Chinese memory. | ||
| But 1857 lives, even if hesitantly, its romance undiminished. It gave India its first, hesitant feel of nationhood. That is why Marxist fellow-traveller Rudrangshu Mukherjee is so hopelessly wrong when he attributes Mangal Pandey’s individual revolt to everything (including addiction to bhang and unrequited love) except nationalist fervour. | ||
| If that were true, disbanded soldiers of the Bengal Regiment would not have carried back tales of his valour to their villages in Avadh, nor would hair-raising stories of Pandey’s bravado on March 29 have been transmitted by India’s equivalent of the bush telegraph to Meerut, triggering the violent eruption of May 10. | ||
| That however brings us no closer to defining the Great Uprising. Indeed, we will probably remain as confused another 150 years later. Such was the terror the British unleashed in the aftermath of their victory that few contemporary scribes or historians ventured to record either the character or legacy of 1857. And, lest we forget by virtue of the time-ordained Hindu disregard for history, British terror could indeed be terrifying. For instance, the “liberator” of Delhi, John Nicholson, whose tomb was recently restored, walked into a dinner shortly after his re-conquest of the city, almost an hour late, and proffered this by way of a nonchalant apology: “Sorry to be delayed, gentlemen; I was busy hanging your cooks.” | ||
| To cite a significantly later example just to establish continuity, we know from the memoirs of Hugh Lane, ICS, the first British official to set foot in UP’s easternmost district of Ballia, peacefully “liberated” for seven days by otherwise law-abiding, middle class Congress leaders in response to the Quit India call of 1942: “None dared to don the Gandhi cap in this rebellious district till 1944 when Feroze Gandhi arrived wearing one and admonished his partymen for being so timid.” | ||
| India’s colonial masters learnt many lessons from 1857, the most important being not to permit perpetuation of the Uprising’s memory. Astonishingly, little survives even in folklore, nor the eloquent writings of the period’s most prolific poet, Mirza Ghalib. It is easier deciphering the heroics of the forgotten Baba Ramchandra of Faizabad (Jawaharlal Nehru in Discovery of India attributes his first interaction with peasants to the semi-religious, itinerant preacher’s skill in mass mobilisation) than reconstructing the totality of the Great Uprising. Yet India celebrates the pathos of its last Mughal, Bahadur Shah Zafar, exiled to Rangoon, with eloquent nostalgia: | ||
| Itna hai badnaseeb Zafar | ||
| Dafn ke liye | ||
| Do gaz zameen na milee | ||
| Ku-e-yaar mein | ||
| Lagta nahin hai jee mera | ||
| Ujdey dayar mein | ||
| But nobody dared write a comprehensive history of what happened during the steamy summer of 1857, replete with tales of valour and cowardice, revenge and retribution. Surprisingly, there are many heart-rending tales of despair written about the defeat of the indolent, incompetent Siraj-ud-Daulah at Plassey, exactly 100 years before the Great Uprising; or the tragedy of the languid Nawab of Avadh, Wajid Ali Shah, whose mal-administered kingdom was annexed by Lord Dalhousie in 1846. | ||
| Maybe the absence of a composite historiography of 1857 can be attributed to Muslim historians’ discomfort with recording Islam’s final defeat in its erstwhile domain. At least that is the hypothesis of William Dalrymple, writer of the superb narrative on the unfolding of the Uprising in Delhi, woven around the derelict court of the last titular head of the Mughal Empire. | ||
| Since most of the Indian source material is in archaic Farsi script, it stands to reason that India’s Muslim historians would have been best placed to reconstruct the story. Maybe the Marxist orientation of Aligarh historians had a further bearing on 1857 being skipped from contemporary historical discourse. | ||
| Does that mean 1857 left no lasting legacy? Sadly, it must be admitted that beyond disjointed, disparate legends of individual valour and tragedy, not much of 1857 resides in India’s collective memory. One reason was the confinement of the Uprising to roughly today’s Hindi heartland. Although its first spark was lit by Sepoy Mangal Pandey at Barrackpore, a Calcutta suburb, the spark became a prairie fire only with the mutiny at Meerut and the rapid fall of Delhi. | ||
| It spread through most of what is now Uttar Pradesh, affected parts of adjoining Bihar and Central India but left the rest of the subcontinent virtually untouched. In fact, Bengal has little or no memory of 1857, nor do other eastern parts of India. The west and south were almost totally untouched. | ||
| The rising new metropolitan centres around Calcutta, Bombay and Madras were not only insulated from the disturbances in the Gangetic Plains, but also petrified at the thought of East India Company rule being challenged. These were the upcoming locations of trade and commerce. The coastal presidencies, non-existent prior to colonial incursions, had developed vested interests in the perpetuation of British supremacy. The comprador bourgeoisie never had it so good. | ||
| The new middle class were also products of English education that began with Lord Macaulay’s famous Minute of 1835, resulting in the establishment of the Hare School and Presidency College in Calcutta, Elphinstone College in Bombay and the Madras Christian College. Alumni of these institutions shared little historically or culturally with the native elite of Upper Hindostan, loathed the indolent princes of kingdoms like Avadh and considered the Uprising an anachronism. | ||
| Significantly, the new elite in the coastal presidencies was almost entirely Hindu. Contrary to the attempt by so-called secular historians to paint the Uprising as a landmark of communal amity, there were undercurrents of tension. In their own quiet way, Hindus were beginning to assert their identity and looked upon British rule as deliverance from Islamic “tyranny”. The concluding message of Bankim Chandra’s Ananda Math, which extols the British for getting rid of Muslim rule, is a categorical assertion of Hindu resurgence. | ||
| While it is true that the Great Uprising, wherever it happened, was marked by an alliance between orthodox Hindus and their Muslim counterparts, the rebellion itself was limited not just geographically but also historically. History was on the side of the British because modern India was still in an embryonic stage in 1857. Modern India’s time would come only around the turn of the 19th century. Tragic as it seems from the perspective of romantic nationalism, the defeat of 1857 was written into its genes. |



